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The Cape Town Convention and the Law of Outer
Space: Five Scenarios
Mark J. Sundahl*

The adoption of the Space Assets Protocol to the Cape Town Convention marked a new era in the evolution of the law of
outer space by providing the first space treaty regarding private international law. This Protocol was not created in a legal
vacuum, but was drefted against the background of the existing United Nations space treaties that were drafted in the 1960s
and 1970s. Although the existing UN treaties address public international law and therefore cover subject matter that is
quite distinct from the private law issues addressed by the Space Assets Protocol, there are still points at which the Protocol
intersects with the existing treaties. This article explores these intersections, and even potential conflicts, between the Protocol
and the existing treaties. Five hypothetical scenarios are presented to illustrate these intersections between the new and old
laws and suggestions are made for how existing space law may either interfere with the operation of the Protocol or, in some
cases,facilitate its operation.

The Cape Town Convention (together with
its Space Assets Protocol) has ushered in a
new era of international space law as the first
international treaty that addresses private law,
that is, the rights and obligations of parties
engaged m business transactions. 1 Earlier
international space law applies to commercial
space activity in certain respects, but the rights
and obligations apply only to states. For example,
a state has the duty to supervise the commercial
space activities of its nationals. Similarly, the
' Professor and Associate Dean for Administration,
Cleveland
State
University,
Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law. I would like to recognize Paul Larsen's
significant work on this subject which proved to be of
immense help as I wrote this article.
1
Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment, 16 November 2001, Senate Treaty Doc No
108-10, <www.unidroit.org/ english/ conventions/ cmain. ht;;;>(C~p~-- T~~;;-·c:;;;;;~;;;r~;;); --p;:~;;;zcl't~
t~·c·~;:;;~;,tion on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets, in Final
Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of
the Draft Protocol to the Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific
UNIDROIT Doc DCME-SP-Doc.
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duty of states to return to the launching state
errant spacecraft that have crashed in their
territory extends to the return of privately
owned spacecraft. However, a private company
has no standing under international law to
demand the return of its errant spacecraft. In
contrast, a bank that has an international interest
in the form of a security interest in a satellite
has a right to exercise remedies under the Cape
Town Convention if the debtor defaults on its
payment obligations - because a state that is a
party to the Convention is required to enforce
the bank's right to exercise these remedies.
The Cape Town Convention also differs
from the earlier space treaties in the nature of
the concerns that motivated its creation. In
contrast to the earlier treaties, the Cape Town
Convention is motivated by the concerns that
arise from private transactions rather than
governmental interests. 2 Rather than being
2

See PB Larsen, 'Critical Issues in the UNIDROIT
Draft Space Protocol' in Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2003) 2, 4 (explaining
that' [t]he Protocol is concerned primarily with private
law and with the protections of financiers who enter
into private law contracts, whereas existing space law is
primarily public law.').
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driven by concerns of sovereignty claims and
militarization, the Cape Town Convention
addresses the needs of private financiers,
such as the priority of secured parties, title to
purchased assets, and remedies upon default.
This stark difference in the subject matter of
the Convention in contrast to the existing space
treaties results for the most part in an absence of
intersection and conflict between the treaties. 3
Nevertheless, some intersections do arise and
must be kept in mind by practitioners and
courts that are involved in the application of
the Convention. The need for this vigilance is
heightened by the fact that the Convention and
Protocol are, by their own terms,subordinated to
the terms of the existing space treaties. In light
of this, the practitioner involved in a transaction
governed by the Cape Town Convention must
understand not only the Convention and
Protocol, but also the broader body of space
law. This article explores five hypothetical
scenarios that illustrate potential intersections
and conflicts between the Convention and the
existing law of outer space.
I. A Concise Introduction to the Law of
Outer Space
The codification of space law began with the
1962 United Nations Declaration ef Legal Principles
Governing the Activities ef States in the Exploration
3
P van Fenema, 'The UNIDROIT Space Protocol,
the Concept of 'Launching State', Space Traffic
Management and the Delimination of Outer Space
(Report of the 41st Session of the UNCOPUOS
Legal Subcommittee)' (2002) 27 Air & Space L 266,
275 (explaining that during a meeting in 1997 the
UNIDROIT Space Working Group 'concluded that
there was no conflict between the provisions of the
draft Protocol and the existing body of space law' and
that the ITU indicated 'that it saw neither overlap nor
contradiction between the [Cape Town] Convention
and the draft Protocol, on the one hand, and the ITU
Constitution, Convention and Radio Regulations,
on the other.'); PB Larsen (n 2) 3 (explaining that the
COPUOS Legal Subcommittee 'agreed with the no
conflicts principle' recognized by the Space Working
Group). For the views of the UNCOPUOS Legal
Subcommittee see UN Committee of Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, Report of the Legal Subcommittee on
its forty-first session, UN Doc AlAC.105/787 (2002).
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and Use ef Outer Space. 4 This Declaration included the following fundamental principles that
formed the bedrock of international space law:

• That space should be explored and used for
the benefit of all mankind; 5
• That space is open to free exploration by
all states; 6
• That no state can claim sovereignty over
space or celestial bodies; 7
• That space should be used in accordance
with international law and in the interests
of peace; 8
• That states must bear responsibility for
their activity in space, supervise activities of
non-governmental parties, and be liable for
harm caused by their activity or by their
nationals; 9
• That states maintain a registry of their space
objects; 10
• That space activity be guided by
international cooperation and that states
avoid interference with the activities of
other states; 11
• That the state of registry maintain jurisdiction and control over a space object; 12
• That ownership shall not be affected by an
object's entry into space; 13
• That states provide assistance to astronauts
in distress; 14 and
• That states return to the launching state any
astronauts or space objects found on their
territory or on the high seas. 15
4

Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, UNGA Res 1962, 1280th plen mtg, UN Doc
A/RES/1962 (13 December 1963) (Declaration of
Principles).
5

Ibid para 1.

6

Ibid para 2.

7

Ibid para 3.

8

Ibid para 4.

9

Ibid paras 5 & 8.

10

Ibid para 7.

11

Ibid para 6.

12

Ibid para 7.

13

Ibid para 7.

14

Ibid para 2.

15

Ibid paras 7 & 9.
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These principles reflect the issues and concerns
that existed at the time of drafting. Space
activity was limited to governments and the
prospect of private commercial space use was
a rather distant concept. The concerns of the
United States and the Soviet Union were of
a governmental nature, namely, to prevent the
appropriation of space by the other state, to
avoid the militarization of space, to maintain
control over their satellites, and to ensure
the rescue and return of their astronauts and
spacecraft.
In the years following the adoption of the
Declaration of Legal Principles, five treaties
were drafted under the auspices of the United
Nations to codify and elaborate upon the
principles contained in the Declaration. These
five core space treaties include:
• The Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space
Treaty); 16
• The Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into
Space (Rescue and Return Agreement); 17
• The Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects
(Liability Convention); 18
• The Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (Registration
Convention); 19 and
16

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(adopted 27 January 1967, entered into force 10
October 1967) 610 UNTS 205 (Outer Space Treaty).
17
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Space (adopted 22 April 1968, entered
into force 3 December 1968) 672 UNTS 119 (Rescue
and Return Agreement).
18

Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (adopted 29 March 1972,
entered into force 1 September 1972) 961 UNTS 187
(Liability Convention).
19

Convention on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (adopted 14 January 1975, entered
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• The Agreement Governing Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Moon Agreement). 20
All of these treaties have entered into force and
have been broadly ratified, with the exception
of the Moon Agreement which, although it
received a sufficient number of ratifications
to enter into force, has been ratified by only
thirteen states (none of which are space
powers). 21 One additional area of international
law that could be implicated by the operation of
the Cape Town Convention is the international
law governing telecommunications. This area
of the law regulates the allocation of orbital
slots for telecommunications satellites and the
use of radio frequencies. This law is overseen
by the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) and the governing documents
include the Constitution of the International
Telecommunications Union, the Convention ef the
International Telecommunication Union, and the
ITU Radio Regulations. 22 Although there are
potential intersections between the Cape Town
Convention and ITU instruments, this article
will only consider the five UN space treaties.
The relationship between the Convention and
customary international law regarding outer
space activities also falls outside the scope of
this article.
The following sections will examine how
the Cape Town Convention interacts with
space law through five illustrative examples.
into force 15 September 1976) 1023 UNTS 15
(Registration Convention).
20

Agreement Governing Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 18
December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363
UNTS 3 (Moon Agreement).
21
Status of International Agreements Relating to
Activities in Outer Space, Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, 6 June 2011, UN Doc Al
AC.105/2011/CRP 12.
22
Constitution
of
the
International
Telecommunications
Union
<http:/ /www.itu.
int/aboutitu/basic-texts/ constituti~~htrul>~·(ITU
ConvE,ntt on-~-~f~-a;_;;~T;t-;;:national

Telecommunication
Union
<http:/ I ~~~21::?:.
int/ aboutitu/basic-texts/ convention.html> (ITU
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However, before taking up these particular
points of intersection between existing space
law and the Cape Town Convention, the next
section discusses the preliminary issue regarding
how conflicts between the Convention and
other sources of space law should be resolved.

II. The Relationship between the Cape
Town Convention and the UN Treaties
The effect of the Cape Town Convention
on the existing law of outer space was of
critical concern to members of the Space
Assets Working Group during the drafting
of the Space Assets Protocol. As mentioned
above, there was concern among governments
and academics that the Space Assets Protocol
would inadvertently upset the existing system
of international space law. For example, there
was concern that the registry of international
interests would somehow conflict with the
existing register of space objects maintained
by the United Nations and negatively affect
the legal implications of the UN register. To
resolve these concerns the Working Group
addressed the relationship of existing space
law to the Convention in two ways in the
Protocol.
First, the fourth recital in the
preamble to the Protocol recognizes the
importance of preserving the principles of
space law: 23
MINDFUL of the established principles of
space law, including those contained in the
international space treaties of the United
Nations and the instruments of the International
Telecommunication Union ...

Although the language of a treaty preamble
is not binding, it does help to define the
context of the treaty which, under the Vienna
Convention, must be taken into account when
interpreting the treaty. The word 'mindful' is
not particularly reassuring to those who might
wish for a stronger statement of the absolute
primacy of existing space law. But the word
means at a minimum that the drafters were
aware of the importance of existing space
law - and perhaps that the treaty should be
23

112

Space Assets Protocol Preamble Fourth Recital.

interpreted to the extent possible in a manner
that is consistent with existing space law.
Second, Article XXXV of the Protocol,
reproduced
here,
explicitly
establishes
the primacy of the UN treaties and ITU
instruments over the Convention: 24
The Convention as applied to space assets does
not affect State Party rights and obligations
under the existing United Nations outer space
treaties or instruments of the International
Telecommunication Union.

This provision is binding on the parties to
the Protocol and establishes the primacy
of the five United Nations treaties and the
ITU instruments over the provisions of the
Convention. Unlike the fourth recital of the
preamble, only the United Nations treaties
and ITU instruments are mentioned in this
article, thus leaving any conflicts between the
Convention and other sources of international
space law to be resolved according to the
principles of lex posterior and lex specialis (which
would almost certainly give primacy to the
Convention and Protocol). This means that
there is at least the potential that some areas of
space law will be trumped by the Convention
and Protocol. If customary international law or
treaties concluded by states outside the auspices
of the United Nations or the ITU conflict with
the Convention, primacy will likely be given to
the Convention.

III. The Five Scenarios
The following five hypothetical scenarios
illustrate situations in which the Cape Town
Convention and Space Assets Protocol intersect
with the UN space treaties and identify legal
interactions that can affect the operation
of the Convention (and in some cases the
operation of the UN treaties). These situations
arise with respect to (i) the operation of the
Liability Convention, (ii) the operation of the
Rescue and Return Agreement, and (iii) the
jurisdictional provisions found in the Outer
Space Treaty and the Registration Convention.
24

Space Assets Protocol art XXXV
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A. Scenario # 1: Liability Continues Despite
Transfer of the Space Asset

Bank finances the construction of a
satellite owned by Satco and the satellite
is launched into orbit from State X. Bank
takes a security interest in the satellite
which is enforceable as an 'international
interest'
under
the
Cape
Town
Convention. When SatCo's business fails,
Bank enforces its international interest
by selling the satellite to TeleSat, a stateowned enterprise wholly owned by
State Z. Two years later, due to State
Z's negligence, the satellite reenters the
atmosphere and causes extensive damage
on the surface of the Earth. Who is liable
for the damage?
Under this scenario, State X will bear absolute
liability for the damage under the Liability
Convention. The Liability Convention imposes
liability on the 'launching state' under two
rubrics. Article II of the Liability Convention
imposes strict liability on the 'launching State'
for all damage caused by a space object on
Earth or to aircraft in flight: 25
A launching State shall be absolutely liable to
pay compensation for damage caused by its space
object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft
in flight.

In contrast, Article III of the Convention
imposes liability on the launching state when a
space object causes damage to the space object
of another state when the object is in the air or
in space, but only when the launching state is
'at fault': 26
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere
than on the surface of the Earth to a space object
of one launching State or to persons or property
on board such a space object by a space object of
another launching State, the latter shall be liable
25

Liability Convention art II.

26

Ibid art III. Note that both Article II andArticle III
address damage caused in airspace, with the distinction
being that Article II governs damage caused to aircraft
while Article III addresses damage to space objects
(which are presumably either en route to or returning
from space).
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only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault
of persons for whom it is responsible.

Under Article I of the Liability Convention,
the definition of a 'launching State' that could
bear liability for damage caused by a space
object remains unchanged from the Outer
Space Treaty and includes (1) a state which
launches a space object, (2) a state which
procures the launch of a space object, (3) a
state from whose territory a space object is
launched and (4) a state from whose facility a
space object is launched. 27 This last category
could apply to a state that owns a launching
facility, for example, located on an artificial
island on the high seas. In the event that there
are multiple launching states, each state is
jointly and severally liable for damage caused
by the space object. 28 This multi-faceted
definition of a launching state together with
the rule of joint and several liability provides
a state that has suffered damage (or whose
nationals have suffered damage) the possibility
of pursuing multiple states, thus allowing for a
greater likelihood of recovery. 29
The paradigm for state liability for space
activities established by the Outer Space Treaty
and the Liability Convention has been placed
under stress over the years by the gradual
expansion of private commercial activity in
space. The liability paradigm set forth in the
treaties primarily contemplates governmental
space activity which involves a state launching
a satellite or spacecraft and maintaining control
over that space object for its entire lifespan. 30
27

Liability Convention art I.

28

Ibid artV(1) and (3).

29

See S Hobe, B Schmidt-Tedd and K Schrogl (eds),
Cologne Commentary on Space Law, Vol. 1 (Carl Heymanns
Verlag 2009) 135; see also RJ Lee, 'Reconciling
International Space Law with the Commercial Realities
of the Twenty-First Century' (2000) 4 Singapore J Intl &
Comparative L 194, 200-01 (explaining how there could,
theoretically, 'be well over four launching States in any
single launch.'). Liability also attaches if an attempted,
but unsuccessful, launch of a space object causes harm.
Liability Convention art I(b).
30
Although governmental use of space was the
primary scenario contemplated by the drafters of the
space treaties, there was also an understanding that
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With the advent and expansion of private
space activity, the complexities of commercial
transactions, including the transfer of ownership
of a space object during its operational lifespan
(such as on-orbit satellites), challenged the
propriety of the existing liability paradigm.
While these issues have existed since the
commercialization of space began, some of the
tensions between commercialization and the
existing law of outer space may be exacerbated
by the use of the Cape Town Convention.
A widely criticized shortcoming of the
existing law of outer space is that the launching
state continues to be liable under the Outer
Space Treaty and Liability Convention even
after the transfer of the space object by the
launching state, or by one of its nationals, to
another state or private party (or after the state's
loss of direct control over the object through
other circumstances, such as the lease of an
object). 31 The liability imposed by the treaties
on a launching state is perpetual, with only a
few narrow exceptions. Critics of this result see
a fundamental unfairness in imposing liability
on the launching state when it was in no way
commercial activity would also take place, as is made
clear in the Outer Space Treaty's reference in Article VI
to space activity by 'non-governmental entities.'
31
See, eg, FG von der Dunk, 'The Illogical Link:
Launching, Liability and Leasing' in Proceedings of

the Thirty-Sixth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space

(American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
1993) 349, 351; M Chatzipanagiotis, 'Registration of
Space Objects and Transfer of Ownership in Orbit'
(2007) 56 Zeitschrift fur Lu.ft- und Weltraumrecht 229,
230; PB Larsen (n 2) 5; HR Hertzfeld and FG von
der Dunk, 'Bringing Space Law into the Commercial
World: Property Rights Without Sovereignty'
(2005) 6 Chicago J Intl L 81, 89; RJ Lee, 'Effects of
Satellite Ownership Transfers on the Liability of the
Launching States' in Proceedings of the Forty-Third
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2001)
148, 151; PB Larsen, 'UNIDROIT Space Protocol:
Comments on the Relationship between the Protocol
and Existing International Space Law' in Proceedings of
the Forty-Fourth Colloquium on the Law

of Outer

Space

(American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
2002) 187, 190; UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/L.225, 23
January 2001.
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involved in the harmful activity. This issue may
be exacerbated by the entry of the Cape Town
Convention into force with respect to space
assets under the theory that the Convention
will result in an increase in the sale and lease
of space assets after their launch. The increase
in sales and leases under the Convention will
arise not only in simple sales and leases, but
through sales and leases that take place in the
form of remedies pursued by secured creditors.
This increase in transactions is likely to occur
if the Cape Town Convention is perceived as
being useful to facilitate such transactions by
providing rights and remedies, or other benefits,
which were not available under pre-existing law.
The increase in sales and leases will create more
situations in which the launching state loses
control over the space object (or loses control,
by way of loss of jurisdiction, over the entity
that controls the space object), thus making
more distinct the disconnection between the
existing liability regime and the realities of
commercial space activity. In addition, the right
of a secured creditor to repossess a space asset
or take control of the asset upon default (in
advance of selling or leasing the asset) will place
additional stress on the existing liability regime
by potentially interfering with the launching
state's ability to control the asset even before it
is sold or leased. For the launching state will
potentially bear liability for any damage caused
by the asset (and will bear absolute liability for
any damage caused in the air or on Earth) even
though the launching state has been deprived
of any ability to control the asset due to secured
creditors seizing control of the asset under the
Cape Town Convention.
B. Scenario #2: The Convention Assists in
Determining Liability

Bank finances the construction of a
satellite owned by a secretive company,
X Corp, and the satellite is launched into
orbit from an unknown location under
high secrecy.Bank takes a security interest
in the satellite which is enforceable as an
'international interest' under the Cape
Town Convention. Bank registered the
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international interest before the launch.
The satellite fails to reach a sustainable
orbit and causes damage in State Y after
reentering the atmosphere and falling to
Earth soon after launch. The launching
state does not submit any information
about the launch to the UN under the
Registration Convention because the
satellite failed to reach orbit. State Y
is unable to determine the identity of
the company or the launching state of
the satellite for purposes of assigning
liability under the Liability Convention.
In this scenario, the registration of an
international interest m the Cape Town
Registry could provide information that might
assist in the recovery of damages by the injured
party under domestic law or under the Liability
Convention. Provided that the identifying
information was preserved on the remains of
the satellite, the Cape Town Registry could be
searched and would reveal the parties involved
in the financing transaction. After discovering
that Bank held an international interest in the
satellite, the damaged party could approach
Bank to discover the identity of the debtor who
launched the satellite. An action could then be
brought against the private entity that owned
the satellite or against the launching state (if
further inquiry revealed the place of launch).
In a scenario such as this, the Cape Town
Convention could have a beneficial effect
by facilitating the operation of the liability
provisions of the space treaties because the
registry of international interests will (1) aid
in the identification of space objects that have
caused damage and (2) aid in the identification
of entities that have actual control over space
objects. The identification of the private party
in control of the space asset that has caused
harm will aid in bringing an action for damages
against that party under applicable domestic
law. Moreover, the registry of international
interests may aid in identifying the state that
bears liability under international law.
One of the challenges of finding a state
liable for damage caused by a space object is
identifying the launching state. The United
November 2014

Nations register of space objects that is
maintained pursuant to the Registration
Convention plays a critical role in helping to
identify launching states. The Registration
Convention was adopted in 197 5 to establish
a central international register of space objects
for a variety of reasons including (1) improving
awareness of objects in orbit, (2) establishing
the jurisdiction and control over space objects
by the state of registry, and (3) identifying the
launching state of objects that cause damage. 32
The Cape Town Convention registry of
international interests in space assets can
serve the same function as the UN register by
assisting in the identification of the launching
state or other states (or entities) that may face
liability for damage caused by a space object. 33
But rather than merely duplicating the benefits
of the UN register, the registry of international
interests will supplement the UN register by
providing information that may not be available
through the UN register. Like the information
collected under the Registration Convention,
the registry of international interests will be
available to the public online. However, the
type of information provided on the registry
will differ significantly from information
found on the UN register. The registry of
international interests will be searchable by
asset and the records returned upon a search
will provide the name of any parties that have
registered or recorded any interest in the
asset. In addition, instead of providing the
names of the launching states, the registry of
international interests will contain the names
of the holders of an international interest in the
asset or a buyer that has registered a sale. The
registry of international interests also differs
from the UN register in that (1) states register
space objects in the UN register to comply
with international law while parties register
international interests to protect their financial
interests and (2) states are only required to
submit information to the UN when an
32
Regarding the Registration Convention see
generally, F Lyall and PB Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise
(Ashgate 2009) 84-96.
33

This possibility is raised in PB Larsen (n 2) 6.
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object has reached space while holders of an
international interest are likely to register long
before launch. In light of these differences
between the two registries, the Cape Town
Convention registry could complement the
UN register in a number of ways.
First, a space object that is not on the UN
register may be registered on the Cape Town
Convention registry. If the launching state is
not a party to the Registration Convention,
but is involved in a transaction related to a
space object that gives rise to a registrable
interest under the Space Assets Protocol, there
will likely be a registration related to the object
on the Cape Town Convention registry. 34
Second, a space object that causes damage
on Earth may be easier to identify through
information that is found on the Cape Town
Convention registry and may not be on the
UN register, such as a serial number. 35 The
registry of international interests will also carry
information about components ofspace objects
(since international interests in components
are separately registrable), which could assist
in the identification of the space object as a
whole. Although a search for international
interests will only reveal the name of the buyer
or creditor, this information can lead, through
further inquiry, to the identity of the launching
state or other responsible party.
Third, the Cape Town Convention registry
will capture transfers of ownership of space
objects (and the transfer of control through
leases) through the registration of sales and
leases. This information could be useful if a
damaged state is seeking reparations under the
theory that the 'appropriate state' is responsible
for the damage due to its failure to properly
authorize or supervise the space activity that
caused the damage. Similarly, the registration
of sales and leases will be helpful to determine
what party had actual control of a space object
at the time damage occurred, which could help
support a claim under state responsibility for its
34
35

PB Larsen (n 31) 188.

See, eg, ibid (explaining that the Protocol has
more stringent identification requirements than the
Registration Convention).
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national activities in space or under domestic
tort laws.
C. Scenario #3:The Rescue and Return Agreement
Assists in the Application ef the Convention

A reusable space capsule is launched
from State X, which is a party to the
Cape Town Convention, and upon
reentry loses controls of its landing
trajectory and unexpectedly lands in
State Y. State Y is not a party to the Cape
Town Convention, but is a party to the
Rescue and Return Agreement. Bank
financed the construction of the space
capsule and holds a security interest
subject to the Cape Town Convention.
Bank wants to enforce its international
interest and repossess the space capsule.
In this scenario, Bank would not be able to
proceed against the space capsule under the
Cape Town Convention in State Y However,
State Y would be required under the Rescue
and Return Agreement to return the capsule to
State X, which would then allow the creditor
to proceed under the Cape Town Convention
in State X to repossess the capsule and pursue
other remedies.
The duty to return space objects was
originally contained in Paragraph 7 of the 1962
Declaration of Principles and in Article VIII the
1968 Outer Space Treaty. 36 Just one year after
the Outer Space Treaty was completed, the
Rescue and Return Agreement was concluded
in order to elaborate upon the duty to rescue
and return that had been established in the
Outer Space Treaty. 37 The fact that this treaty
was drafted before the drafting of the treaties
regarding liability and registration were taken
up reflects the importance attached by the
United States and the Soviet Union to the
duty to rescue astronauts and return lost space
objects. Although the duty to rescue astronauts
36
Declaration of Principles para 7; Outer Space
Treaty art VIII.
37
For a thorough discussion of the duty to rescue
astronauts and return space objects see MJ Sundahl,
'The Duty to Rescue Space Tourists and Return
Private Spacecraft' (2009) 35 J Space L 163.
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could be said to be purely humanitarian in
spirit, the duty to return lost space objects was
motivated by the desire to reclaim sensitive
technology that had fallen out of the control of
the launching state.
Regarding the duty to return errant space
objects, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty
provides as follows: 38
[O]bjects or component parts found beyond the
limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose
registry they are carried shall be returned to that
State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish
identifying data prior to their return.

Article 5 of the Rescue and Return Agreement
requires the return of any space object to the
state of registry whenever the object is found
outside of that state's jurisdiction, regardless of
the circumstances leading to the discovery of
the object: 39
Upon request of the launching authority, objects
launched into outer space or their component
parts found beyond the territorial limits of the
launching authority shall be returned to or held
at the disposal of representatives of the launching
authority, which shall, upon request, furnish
identifying data prior to their return.

The space object (or component parts) must be
returned to the 'launching authority.' The term
'launching authority' is defined in Article 6 of
the Rescue and Return Agreement: 40
For the purposes of this Agreement, the
term 'launching authority' shall refer to the
State responsible for launching, or, where an
international
intergovernmental
organization
is responsible for launching, that organization,
provided that that organization declares its
acceptance of the rights and obligations provided
for in this Agreement and a majority of the States
members of that organization are Contracting
Parties to this Agreement and to the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

In short, an errant space object must be returned
to the state (or under the conditions stated, the
38

Outer Space Treaty art VIII.

39

Rescue and Return Agreement art 5(3).

40

Ibid art 6.
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international intergovernmental organization)
that is 'responsible for launching' the object.
It should be kept in mind that the duties
under the Rescue and Return Agreement, as
well as the Outer Space Treaty, are only triggered
with respect to those spacecraft or other space
objects that have been 'launched into outer
space.' 41 This means that creditors cannot look
to the Rescue and Return Agreement or Outer
Space Treaty for assistance in recovering errant
space assets unless the assets have been launched.
For example, a satellite warehoused in a foreign
state prior to launch will have to be recovered
by the creditor without the aid of these treaties.
In addition to the scenario set forth at the
outset of this section, there are other potential
situations in which the Rescue and Return
Agreement may be implicated in a transaction
governed by the Cape Town Convention. 42
Some of these scenarios involve the operation
of the Rescue and Return Agreement to
the benefit of the holder of an international
interest, while other situations may arise in
which the Rescue and ReturnAgreement may
operate in a manner that would be detrimental
to the interests of a creditor. One such scenario
is discussed in the next section.
D. Scenario #4: The Rescue and Return Agreement
Inteiferes with the Application ef the Cape Town
Convention

A reusable space capsule is launched by
Company from State A, which is not a
party to the Cape Town Convention.
On its return to Earth, the space
capsule guidance systems malfunction
and the capsule lands unexpectedly
in State B, which is party to both the
Rescue and Return Agreement and the
Cape Town Convention. The bad press
41
Rescue and Return Agreement Preamble First
Recital art 5(3); Outer Space Treaty art VIII.
42

This intersection between existing space law
and the Cape Town Convention has been discussed
by Larsen and Heilbock. PB Larsen and JA Heilbock,
'UNIDROIT Project on Security Interests: How the
Project Affects Space Objects' (1999) 64 J Air L &
Commerce 703, 719.
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from the emergency landing resulted
in cancellations by future customers.
Under financial distress from the loss
of business, Company defaults on its
obligations to Bank. Bank immediately
attempts to enforce its international
interest against the capsule under the
Cape Town Convention by applying for
a court order in State B to allow Bank's
repossession of the space capsule. At the
same time, Company seeks to avoid the
repossession of the capsule by requesting
that State A make a diplomatic request of
State B to return the capsule to State A,
which is the 'launching authority' under
the Rescue and Return Agreement.
In this scenario, State B's obligation under the
Rescue and Return Agreement could lead
to a result that is contrary to the interests of
the creditor. Under the Rescue and Return
Agreement, State B is required to return the
capsule to State A, which is not a party to the
Cape Town Convention - an action which may
impede the exercise of the creditor's remedies
under the Convention.
How will the conflict between these two
competing treaty obligations be resolved? On
the one hand, the Cape Town Convention
requires the courts of State B to grant Bank
possession. On the other hand, the Rescue and
Return Agreement requires State B to return
the space capsule to State A. Under the Cape
Town Convention, primacy is given to the
Rescue and Return Agreement and the court
may have to dismiss Bank's case requesting
repossession. When the capsule is returned
to State A, Bank will have no choice but to
proceed against the capsule under the domestic
laws of State A (which, without the benefit of
the Cape Town Convention, may be inimical to
its interests). 43 This obstructionist effect of the
Rescue and Return Agreement may be sought
43

Of course, if State A were a party to the Cape
Town Convention and Protocol, once the asset were
returned to State A under the Rescue and Return
Agreement, the courts of State A would have to enforce
the creditor's right to enforce its remedies under the
Convention. See PB Larsen (n 31) 192.

1Hl

out by debtors who could choose to launch
from a state that is not a party to the Cape Town
Convention in an attempt to use the Rescue
and Return Agreement to deprive its creditors
from availing themselves of the remedies of
the Cape Town Convention. It should be kept
in mind that a state is obligated to return a
space object to the launching authority even
if the landing of the object is not the result of
emergency or distress.
The foregoing analysis may lead to a different
result if the vehicle involved in the above
example were a suborbital spaceplane that is
only temporarily in space, and which would
therefore be subject to the Aircraft Protocol
rather than the Space Assets Protocol. Since
the Aircraft Protocol does not give supremacy
to the UN space treaties, any provisions in the
Convention or Aircraft Protocol that conflicted
with the provisions of the Rescue and Return
Agreement would likely be resolved in favor
of the Convention and Aircraft Protocol under
the doctrines of lex posterior or lex specialis. If
this were the case, then Bank in the above
example would likely succeed in its motion
to take possession of the spaceplane since the
obligation of State B to grant Bank possession
would take priority over its duty to return
the spaceplane under the Rescue and Return
Agreement.

E. Scenario #5: The Jurisdictional Provisions
of the Cape Town Conventions are Trumped by
Jurisdictional Provisions in the Space Treaties

Company in State A has a satellite
launched from State B. State B registers
the satellite under the Registration
Convention. The satellite is controlled
from a ground station in State A (and
is therefore 'situated' in State A for
purposes of seeking interim relief under
the Cape Town Convention). A bank in
State C financed the construction and
launch of the satellite. The bank believes
the company has defaulted and seeks
interim relief from a court in State A
to ensure that the satellite is not moved
to a different orbit.
Can Company
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successfully argue that the courts of
State A have no jurisdiction over the
satellite and must dismiss the request for
interim relief?
An argument could be made that the courts of
State A have no jurisdiction and must dismiss
the case because Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty grants jurisdiction over a space object to
the state of registry: 44
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an
object launched into outer space is carried shall
retain jurisdiction and control over such object,
and over any personnel thereof, while in outer
space or on a celestial body.

Pursuant to the Registration Convention,
when a space object is launched into space,
the launching state is required to record the
launch in its national registry (as well as provide
information about the object to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations to be included
in the international register). 45 It is this state of
registry that then has 'jurisdiction and control'
over the object under Article VIII of the Outer
Space Treaty. Given the supremacy of the
Outer Space Treaty, the question arises as to
whether Article VIII affects the operation of
the jurisdictional provisions of the Cape Town
Convention.
Prior to the final enforcement of a remedy
or adjudication of a claim, a party may seek
interim relief under Article 13 of the Cape
Town Convention in those states that have
jurisdiction pursuant to the agreement of
the parties as well as in certain other states
depending on the type of reliefbeing sought. 46
Under Article 43, a state in which the asset is
'situated' has jurisdiction to grant in rem relief,
while a state where the debtor is 'situated'
has jurisdiction to grant in personam relief. 47
Pursuant to the Protocol, a space asset is
44

Outer Space Treaty art VIII.

45

Registration Convention art II(1). If there is more
than one 'launching state', those states are to decide
among themselves which state will be the state of
registry (of which there can be only one). Ibid art II(2).
46
47

'situated' in the territory of a state where 'a
mission control centre for the space asset 1s
located.' 48
The question for parties engaged in a
transaction under the Cape Town Convention,
for lawyers who represent such parties, and for
courts that are asked to adjudicate issues arising
under the Convention is whether Article VIII of
the Outer Space Treaty affects the jurisdictional
provisions of the Convention and the Protocol.
The answer to this question depends on how
'jurisdiction' is interpreted in the Outer Space
Treaty - a question that has been the subject of
considerable academic debate.
As a preliminary matter, the nature of
the various forms of jurisdiction must be
considered. Jurisdiction is generally described
as taking three basic forms of (1) prescriptive
jurisdiction, (2) enforcement jurisdiction, and
(3) adjudicative jurisdiction. 49
Prescriptive
jurisdiction is the right of a state to apply its
laws to the 'activities, relations, or status of
persons, or the interests of persons in things.' 50
Enforcement jurisdiction refers to a state's right
to enforce (or punish noncompliance with) its
laws. 51 Finally, adjudicative jurisdiction is the
right of a state's courts to subject persons or
things to their adjudicative processes and issue a
ruling on a matter. 52 Adjudicative jurisdiction
can arise over persons (in personam jurisdiction)
48

Space Assets Protocol art I(4).

49

C Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law
(OUP 2008) 9. See also generally, WM Reisman (ed),
Jurisdiction in International Law (Ashgate/Dartmouth
1999).

° C Ryngaert (n 49) 9 (citing Restatement (Third)
US. Foreign Relations Law (2014 supp, American
Law Institute 1987) §401(a)).
Under customary
international law, a state has prescriptive jurisdiction
if one of the bases of jurisdiction is present. The
bases of prescriptive jurisdiction are (1) territoriality,
(2) nationality, (3) effects, (4) national security, (5)
passive personality, and (6) universality. K Raustiala,
'The Geography of Justice' (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev
2501, 2512. While territoriality and nationality are
widely accepted as bases of prescriptive jurisdiction
in domestic legal systems, the other bases are accepted
only to varying degrees.
5

of

Cape Town Convention art 13.

51

C Ryngaert (n 49) 9.

Ibid art 43.

52

Ibid 10.
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or over property (in rem jurisdiction). 53 In
addition, jurisdiction can also be 'exclusive' or
'concurrent.' Exclusive jurisdiction exists when
a court has sole jurisdiction over a matter and
no other court is able to assert its jurisdiction.
In contrast, concurrent jurisdiction describes
the situation where multiple courts are able to
assert their jurisdiction over the same matter.
One interpretation ofArticle VIII is that only
the state of registry has jurisdiction of any kind
over a space object and any judicial disputes
regarding that space object. This would mean,
in other words, that the state of registry has
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the space
object and exclusive jurisdiction to hear a
case involving the object. 54 If this approach
is adopted, then Article VIII would trump all
jurisdictional provisions of the Cape Town
Convention and Protocol and would permit
only the state of registry to issue orders regarding
the enforcement of remedies and other matters
arising under the Convention. This would be
53
AT von Mehren, 'Adjudicatory Jurisdiction:
General Theories Compared and Evaluated' (1983) 63
Boston UL Rev 279, 286.
54
See, eg, S Aoki, 'In Search of the Current Legal
Status of the Registration of Space Objects' in Corinne
M Jorgenson (ed), 2010 Proceedings of the International
Institute of Space Law (American Institute ofAeronautics
2011) 245, 248 (stating that' Li]urisdiction arising from
the registration shall be comprehensive, and a State of
registry is supposed to hold legislative, judicial and,
above all, enforcement jurisdiction.'). Aoki admits
that state practice has not always observed such a
far-reaching interpretation of the Article VIII of the
Outer Space Treaty, but does not think that such state
practice affects the interpretation of the treaty See also
M Chatzipanagiotis, The Legal Status of Space Tourists
in the Framework of Commercial Suborbital Flights (Carl
Heymanns Verlag 2011) 48; RJ Lee (n 31) 150-51
(stating that 'only one state can exercise jurisdiction over
... satellites.'); PB Larsen, 'The Draft Space Protocol
and Jurisdiction over Commercial Space Assets' in
Corinne M Jorgenson (ed), 2011 Proceedings of the
International Institute of Space Law (Eleven International
Publishing 2012) 485, 488, 490-91
(citing Aoki's
concept of comprehensive jurisdiction as well as other
commentators who argue that Article VIII provides an
exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the state of registry).
At the end, Larsen concludes that there is uncertainty
as to whether Article VIII's grant of jurisdiction is
exclusive. Ibid 499.
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an absurd result that would render the Cape
Town Convention a nullity since the successful
operation of the Convention requires that a
creditor be able to take action in any state that
exercises actual control over the object or those
parties that control the object.
There are commentators who argue for
a narrower interpretation of Article VIII of
the Outer Space Treaty. The concept of
'jurisdiction' in Article VIII can be more
narrowly read in at least two respects. First, even
if Article VIII is read as granting jurisdiction
of every form to the state of registry, it can
be interpreted as a non-exclusive grant of
jurisdiction - thus enabling other states to assert
jurisdiction when appropriate under other
sources of domestic and international law. 55
These sources would include both customary
international law (which permits a state to
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction if any of the
five bases of prescriptive jurisdiction exists)
and treaty law (which would include a grant of
jurisdiction under the Cape Town Convention
and Protocol). This interpretation of Article
VIII is reasonable pursuant to a plain reading
of its language, which does not state that the
jurisdiction of the launching state is exclusive.
Under this narrower reading of Article VIII,
although State Bin the scenario described at the
outset of this section might have jurisdiction to
grant interim relief as the state of registry, State
A would also have jurisdiction to grant interim
relief under the Cape Town Convention since
the satellite is 'situated in' State A.
Second, Article VIII can be narrowly
interpreted as only granting prescriptive
55
Chatzipanagiotis (n 54) 50 (stating that '[i]t has
been accepted that the State of registry does not have
exclusive jurisdiction.'). Bin Cheng's writings on
jurisdiction also support the reading of Article VIII as
a grant of non-exclusive jurisdiction. B Cheng, 'The
Extra-Terrestrial Application of International Law'
(1965) 18 Current L Problems 132. Cheng explains that
the seventh principle of the Declaration of Principles
(the forerunner of Article VIII) merely codified
customary international law by making clear that the
state of registry would retain any jurisdiction over its
spacecraft and the personnel on board that it would
otherwise have under customary international law. Ibid
141.
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jurisdiction to the state of registry over a space
object (as well as any activity taking place on
board the object). 56 This would make sense in
the greater context of the concept that the state
of registry 'shall retain jurisdiction and control.'
This is a directive that the state of registry
maintain control over the space object and
makes clear that the laws of the state of registry
shall apply to the object (and any activity
taking place on board the object). The actual
enforcement of such regulations by the state
of registry would require that the state have
adjudicative jurisdiction over those parties that
control the object, which would require some
connection of the parties to the state (or in
rem jurisdiction over the object itself). It could
be argued that Article VIII does not address
adjudicative jurisdiction. 57 This interpretation of
Article VIII would mean that there is no conflict
between the Outer Space Treaty and the Cape
Town Convention since the Outer Space Treaty
addresses prescriptive jurisdiction, while the
Cape Town Convention addresses adjudicative
jurisdiction. In the absence of any conflict, the
Convention's jurisdiction provisions would be
unaffected by the existing space law. Moreover,
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty suggests
that any grant of prescriptive jurisdiction
under Article VIII is a non-exclusive grant of
jurisdiction since the duty to supervise national
activity under Article VI presupposes that a state
have prescriptive jurisdiction over the activities
of one's nationals (as well as the space objects
operated by its nationals). 58
56
S Hobe et al, (n 29) 159 (stating that '[t]he
legal consequence of jurisdiction and control is the
applicability of the national law of the State of registry
for the object launched into outer space.'); see also M
Gerhard and K Gungaphul-Brocard, 'The Impact of
National Space Legislation on Space Industry Contracts'
in LJ Smith and I Baumann (eds), Contracting for Space:
Contract Practice in the European Space Sector (Ashgate
2011) 64 (explaining that the grant of jurisdiction to
the state of registry 'defines the law applicable to space
objects.').
57

See, eg, PB Larsen (n 31) 191 (asserting that the
'Outer Space Treaty is not intended to cover the issue
of jurisdiction of national courts.').
58
S Hobe et al, (n 29) 113 (stating that 'a State has
jurisdiction over any activity that is carried on from its
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However these arguments are resolved
in court when the time comes, good faith
arguments can be made on either side. This
scenario provides perhaps the most salient
illustration of why an understanding of the
greater body of space law is necessary for the
practitioner working with the Space Assets
Protocol. This understanding of the law is
essential for both the lawyer striving to use the
space treaties to prevent the enforcement of the
Convention's remedies as well as for the lawyer
who is trying to defend against such arguments.

territory as well as over any activity that is carried on
by its nationals.'); see also ibid 114 (explaining that state
practice in the form of national space legislation reflects
an understanding that the applicability of the legislation
to space activities does not rely on the relevant object
being registered by the state).
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